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Delusions, Dreams and the Nature of Identification 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Delusional misidentification is commonly understood as the product of an inference on the 
basis of evidence present in the subject’s experience. For example, in the Capgras delusion, 
the patient sees someone who looks like a loved one, but who feels unfamiliar, so they infer 
that they must not be the loved one. I question this by presenting a distinction between 
“recognition” and “identification”. Identification does not always require recognition for its 
epistemic justification, nor does it need recognition for its psychological functioning. 
Judgments of identification are often the product of a non-inferential mechanism. Delusional 
misidentification arises as the product of this mechanism malfunctioning.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Capgras delusion is the delusion that one or more known persons, often loved ones, have 
been replaced by identical-looking impostors. Along with a number of other delusions, it is 
classified as a delusion of misidentification, which is to say that the subject misidentifies 
someone or something that one would strongly expect them not to misidentify. What is 
unexpected in the Capgras case is that the subject’s perceptual system seems to be working 
fine: she recognizes how things appear, in the sense that she seems to process visual 
information in the normal way. She is neither partially sighted, nor agnosic, and makes 
accurate judgments concerning what things and people look like.  And yet she misidentifies 
people, often only a strikingly small class of people (namely loved ones). In the presence of, 
say, her father, the Capgras patient will say, “That man is not my father; he looks exactly like 
my father, but isn’t him.” Utterances with similar content can occur in the context of more 
global pathologies, in particular schizophrenia, but in cases where they are caused by brain 
damage, the subjects have been known to lead surprisingly ordinary lives, both cognitively 
and emotionally, when kept away from the individual or individuals that are judged to be 
impostors (see e.g. Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997).  
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Over twenty years ago, Ellis and Young (1990) proposed a model for understanding 
the Capgras delusion that was so well received that it generated an approach to thinking about 
delusions that still constitutes orthodoxy. I will label this orthodoxy the inferential-evidential 
approach, (IEA for short) since it takes the delusional misidentification to arise as an 
inference on the basis of some kind of evidence that is present in the subject’s experience. 
Prominent proponents of IEA include: Maher (1974, 1988, 1999 etc.), Stone and Young 
(1997), Davies et al. (2001), and, to a much lesser extent, Bayne and Pacherie (2004), among 
several others.  
I will proceed as follows. In section 2, I will explain what I mean by “inference” and 
“evidence”. Then I present Ellis and Young’s position as well as some options that have 
recently been taken by others in elaborating this into different forms of IEA. I look at three 
problematic issues for IEA. The first two (the “logical” and “epistemological” issues) are 
philosophical in nature. They consist in explaining how the tracking of individuals 
(identification) differs more profoundly from the recognition of qualitative similarity 
(recognition), both logically and epistemically, than IEA seems to suggest. Furthermore, it is 
shown to be beneficial that a cognitive system should be capable of considering something’s 
identity entirely independently of its appearance, and that this should involve some kind of 
tracking mechanism. The third issue (the “psychological” issue) is empirical in nature, and is 
elaborated throughout section 4. It amounts to claiming not only that the two tasks of 
identification and recognition are different, and that it would be beneficial to have a dedicated 
mechanism for the former, but that humans can and do perform them using two dissociable 
mechanisms. I present evidence for this claim (and in particular the claim that identification 
can be non-inferential in the relevant sense) from empirical work on dreams and the Frégoli 
delusion. In section 5, I tentatively present a theory, which introduces the notion of identity 
files, for the underpinnings of identification, and by extension of misidentification. I then 
examine how the theory compares with its competitors. 
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2. What is the Inferential-Evidential Approach? (IEA) 
 
This section is dedicated to presenting and clarifying IEA. I will begin by clarifying what I 
mean by “inference” and “evidence”. I will then present the Ellis and Young model and 
clarify its epistemological and psychological consequences. 
 
2.1. Clarifying “Inference” and “Evidence” 
Both the terms “inference” and “evidence” get used in different ways. As I am using 
the term, an “inference” is a process that has personal, though not necessarily conscious, steps 
as part of a process of reasoning (in this case abductive reasoning). I mean “personal” in the 
sense that it is attributable to the person and not to a subsystem: it is the person, and not some 
part of them, that performs the inference. It is also the person who, through performing an 
inference, has grounds for belief, and citing these grounds provides evidential justification. 
This sense of “inference” is certainly more universally used in philosophy of mind and 
epistemology than in psychology. In psychology there is a use of “inference” on the basis of 
which parts of your brain can be described as performing “inferences”. This is the sense in 
which people talk of your visual system performing inferences (e.g. on the basis of 
ambiguous input). Some recent paradigms (viz. the “Predictive Coding” paradigm, see Clark 
2013 for a review) even think of the brain as constantly performing statistical “inferences”. 
When I say that I am interested in whether delusional misidentification is inferential or not, I 
am referring to personal inference. It would be trivial, or very nearly so, to say that the 
delusion arises as the result of an inference in the low-level sense, since perhaps almost 
everything in human cognition can be thought of in this way. These low-level inferences can 
give rise to certain experiences, which serve as input for personal-level inference. For 
example, these “inferences” can give rise to certain visual illusions (e.g. the Hollow-mask 
illusion), and although these low-level “inferences” cannot be interfered with evidentially 
(namely, knowing that the mask doesn’t flip doesn’t prevent you from experiencing the 
illusion), knowing that the illusion is an illusion enables you to over-ride what your senses are 
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telling you, namely, you can perform the personal-level inference that, in spite of 
appearances, the mask isn’t actually flipping inside out. 
An inference, in the sense that interests us, can be personal but achieved 
automatically (it can be, to use Pryor’s (2000) term, psychologically immediate) but the 
epistemic steps, if it is indeed an inference, should always be ascertainable (it is not 
epistemically immediate). How can we, therefore, tell between an automatic, personal 
inference, and something that is non-inferential in the personal sense? To use Pryor’s own 
example, I might look at the fuel gauge in my car and, in a psychologically immediate way, 
come to believe that my car needs filling up. However, this is not epistemically immediate in 
the sense that if somebody were to tell me that the gauge is not functioning properly, I would 
thereby cease to take the gauge to be an indication that my car needs filling up. 
How we think of “evidence” further clarifies what is meant by inference. “Evidence” 
is simply that which justifies a belief, drives an inference, and makes it epistemically rational 
(or irrational). So evidence is also a personal notion. Just as the low-level “inferences” that 
psychology sometimes appeals to are not inferences in this sense, so low-level information 
within a subsystem is not evidence.  
Evidential steps mediate a judgment that is based on inference, and an inference can 
be rationally defeated by competing evidence (whereas a low-level “inference” cannot). 
Crucially, for the orthodox view of delusions, evidence thus construed, firstly, is the sort of 
thing that you can ignore or misuse, namely, it is that on which reasoning bias operates, and 
secondly (and in a way that arguably strays from philosophical orthodoxy) allows for private 
experiential evidence.1 It is, for example, not “evidence” in the everyday legal sense of 
publicly accessible entities such as fingerprints. 
                                                 
1 In philosophy, there are two very different readings of ‘evidence’. On one, more externalist, reading, 
x is evidence for p if it actually increases the likelihood of p being true. On another, more internalist 
reading, x is evidence for p if it makes the subject more likely to believe p. To illustrate, on the first 
reading, a brain in a vat has no evidence for its “perceptual” beliefs, even though it thinks it has. On the 
latter reading it could have good evidence. This subjective kind of evidence is what Maher has in mind 
when he says that “delusional belief is not being held “in the face of evidence strong enough to destroy 
it,” but is being held because evidence is strong enough to support it.” (1974, p.99) 
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 With these clarifications out of the way, we turn to Ellis and Young’s model, and 
look at how it is a form of IEA. 
 
 
2.2 Capgras Delusion as “Inverse Prosopagnosia” 
Borrowing Bauer’s (1984) model, whereby there are two streams for processing facial 
information – one covert, affective and anatomically dorsal, the other overt, semantic and 
anatomically ventral – Ellis and Young (1990) put forward the influential proposal that the 
Capgras delusion can be understood as a sort of “inverse prosopagnosia.” Prosopagnosics 
have difficulty in the overt recognition of faces. Show them a picture of a familiar face and 
they will not be able to tell you whose face it is. And yet, surprisingly, some of them appear 
to have differential autonomic responses to these faces, as measured by heightened skin 
conductance response (SCR) (see Bauer 1984). Ellis and Young hypothesized that Bauer’s 
two streams can be selectively impaired, leading to double dissociation. According to them, 
whereas with prosopagnosia the affective stream for “covert recognition” is intact and the 
semantic stream for “overt recognition” is impaired, with the Capgras delusion it is the other 
way around. At a personal level this means that the Capgras patient is presented with 
someone who (thanks to intact subpersonal semantic processing) looks to them exactly like a 
loved one, but the experience is somehow strange (which is the result of deficient subpersonal 
affective processing). The perceived person feels unfamiliar and the patient therefore 
concludes that this person cannot be the loved one in question. This model was given 
experimental support (Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997, Ellis et al. 1997) when it was 
discovered that, in contra-distinction to prosopagnosia, Capgras patients show diminished 
SCR when presented with familiar faces.2  
                                                 
2
 It is worth noting, however, that Bauer’s dual stream model is far from being universally accepted. 
Breen, Caine and Coltheart (2000), for example, deny that the dorsal stream is capable of recognition. 
Rather, with prosopagnosics the ventral route is damaged enough to prevent conscious recognition, but, 
in some cases (in particular in associative rather than apperceptive prosopagnosia), not so damaged as 
to prevent referral to the limbic system. This critique undermines the claim that prosopagnosia and 
Capgras delusion exhibit a double dissociation, but it can leave the epistemic gist of the Ellis and 
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With this in mind, let us examine the notions of overt and covert recognition. 
 
2.3.“Overt Recognition”, “Covert Recognition” and the Delusional Inference 
As we saw, Ellis and Young think that the Capgras patient, when presented with her 
father, judges, “This man has the appearance of my father”. This constitutes overt 
recognition. “Overt” information (on the basis of which one makes an overt judgment) can be 
understood as that which is accessible to consciousness and provides citable justification for 
the subject. If asked, “Why does this man have the appearance of your father?” she might 
reply, “Because he has the same nose, same eyes, same hair etc.” And these are demonstrable 
features that (assuming her perceptual apparatus is working normally and she’s not 
hallucinating) are available for others to see, and in principle could convince them of the 
correctness or plausibility of her claim. Granted, our facial recognition is modularized and 
holistic (see Palermo and Rhodes 2007 for a review), so we have a great facility in dealing 
with facial features: we don’t form the judgment by consciously matching them up in the way 
just described, but the crucial point is that post hoc justification (and support) is available to 
the subject.  
What is meant by “covert”? One might think that “covert” means subpersonal, but we 
need to be careful here. The damage to affective processing is subpersonal, but insofar as the 
covert recognition is a judgment, it is personal, and just as personal as the judgment of overt 
recognition. It is the Capgras patient, the person, who judges “This man does not feel 
familiar/like my father.” This is covert, not in the sense that it is subpersonal, but rather in the 
sense that it is not overt in the sense just described. Namely, if someone were to ask her, 
“Why doesn’t this man feel like your father?” there is no justification that can be adequately 
                                                                                                                                           
Young model intact, namely that a central reason (i.e. evidential subjective grounds) for the delusional 
misidentification is a lack of affective response. Breen, Caine and Coltheart (2000) themselves endorse 
this much, and attribute it (as Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997 do) to a disconnection between the 
FRU (“face recognition unit”) in the temporal cortex and the amygdala. This explains the emotional 
response in associative prosopagnosia, which can still be thought of as “covert recognition” in the 
absence of overt recognition, without claiming that the dorsal stream is capable of recognition. 
It is also worth noting that the claim that some prosopagnosics exhibit covert recognition remains 
untouched. Rather the anatomical claim that this is due to intact dorsal processes is to be rejected. 
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put into words and, relatedly, there is no inter-subjectively available property that can be 
appealed to. The subject is thus robbed of the ability to justify her judgment to others 
(although it may be supported by private, experiential evidence) and would have to reply 
something like, “He just doesn’t.” An inability to (successfully) justify judgments to others is 
an integral part of any case that is likely to be called delusional.3 Delusions (whatever else 
they may be) are beliefs that lack justification or reasonableness by other people’s lights.4 
Although this covert judgment isn’t yet delusional (she could claim: “Although this person 
doesn’t feel like my father, I can see that it is my father”), it is an important precursor on Ellis 
and Young’s model. 
 The delusional subject isn’t merely claiming that this person doesn’t feel familiar, as 
her father should feel. She is claiming that he actually isn’t him. So where does the full-blown 
delusional judgment “This man is not my father” come in? Well, according to Ellis and 
Young, it is the product of a personal-level inference, more specifically, an abductive 
inference to the best explanation (Ellis and Young themselves call this a “rationalization 
strategy”). It takes something like this form: 
 
1. This man looks like my father. 
2. This man feels unfamiliar (hence doesn’t feel like my father).5 
[How do I explain that, although this man looks like my father (and hence should feel 
like my father), he fails to feel like my father?]  
3. He must not be my father. 
 
2.4. Accounting for Tenacity: Two-factor Theories 
                                                 
3 Some delusional patients try to offer (probably confabulated) justification for their delusions, whereas 
others do not. Sometimes they confabulate slight differences in appearance, like “his moustache looks 
different” (cf. e.g. Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997). 
4 Indeed, nothing prevents delusions from being accidentally true. The schizophrenic who claims that 
“the end of the world is nigh”, may happen to be correct thanks to an unforeseeable disaster.  
5 To avoid possible confusion, Ellis and Young do not claim that there is a specific feel for the 
individual and that it is this that is lacking. Rather there is a general lack of familiarity (or general 
presence of unfamiliarity) and that, for the subject, excludes the relevant familiar people. In this case 
the relevant familiar person is the father, since the person the subject sees looks just like his father.  
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If the inference is to be an epistemically rational one, where “epistemic rationality” roughly 
means that a judgment goes only as far as evidence warrants, then 2 (and what it suggests) 
would have to be strong enough evidence to defeat 1. If this is plausible, (and it’s far from 
obvious that it is) it explains the initial formation of the delusion. But the delusion is also 
highly tenacious: it is not just formed briefly but maintained over time and in the face of 
much contrary evidence. For example, no matter how much one tries to convince the subject, 
she still thinks that the man we know is her father, and whom she agrees looks exactly like 
her father, is not her father. Therefore 2, the affectively unusual experience, has to defeat not 
just 1 but also a great deal else: the testimony of others, including people of authority such as 
doctors, and, of course, the obvious implausibility of the delusional scenario; aside from very 
rare cases (viz. identical twins) people statistically just don’t look exactly like a certain 
individual and yet somehow fail to be them.6  
Maher insists that the affectively anomalous experience can play such an epistemic 
role: “delusional belief is not being held “in the face of evidence strong enough to destroy it,” 
but is being held because evidence is strong enough to support it.” (1974, p.99; Reimer 2009 
has recently supported this view, claiming that we simply can’t underestimate the strength or 
strangeness of these patients’ experiences). However, most have found this implausible. 
Instead, they claim, delusional subjects aren’t rational and must have, in addition to their 
unusual experience, a reasoning bias or deficit (Stone and Young 1997; Davies et al. 2001). In 
epistemic terms, delusional subjects attach more credence (i.e. more weight) to 2 than they 
ought to. These are called “two-factor theories”. Since these naturally build on IEA, we will 
address them later. They amount to claiming that the patient’s judgment is based on an 
irrational inference. 
 
                                                 
6 The patients are sometimes sensitive to this implausibility. Patient DS (Hirstein and Ramachandran 
1997, p.438) when asked why this man was pretending to be his father, he replied “That is what is so 
surprising, doctor; why should anyone want to pretend to be my father? Maybe my father employed 
him to take care of me … paid him some money so that he could pay my bills.” Note, however, that 
this assumes that the judgment of misidentification is correct: the implausibility is located at the level 
of the impostor’s motives!  
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2.5. Explanationist and Endorsement Accounts of the Role of the Affective Anomaly 
Whether one is a two-factor theorist or not, if one adopts IEA, the affectively anomalous 
experience still has to constitute strong subjective evidence in favor of the delusional 
hypothesis. There are, broadly speaking, two different views on the role of the anomalous 
experience in the formation of the delusion. So-called explanationist models are closer to Ellis 
and Young’s initial proposal. They (e.g. Maher 1999) say that the content of the affectively 
anomalous experience is something sparse like, “This experience is strange” or perhaps “This 
man feels strange”, and that the delusional judgment explains the bizarre experience (roughly, 
the subject reasons: “This man, in spite of looking like my father, doesn’t feel like my father 
would feel, therefore he cannot be my father”). One prima facie problem with such a view is 
that, if the experience is sparse and non-specific, why is there not a wider array of potential 
hypotheses used to explain it? (“Maybe I don’t like dad anymore”, “Maybe I’m tired” etc.).7 
So-called endorsement models (e.g. Bayne and Pacherie 2004) say that the delusional 
content is encoded directly in the unusual experience, and all that suffices is endorsement of 
that content. According to them, there are not two separate judgments (one about how the 
person looks, and another about how the person feels) that through a process of inference lead 
to the delusional judgment. Rather there is one experience that “tells” the subject something 
like: “This man may look like your father, but it’s not him”. As will become clear, I am far 
more sympathetic to endorsement theories that to explanationist ones. In a sense what I am 
doing in this paper is giving us reason to “pack a lot into the experience”. Although this is 
conducive to the endorsement models, I am not in complete agreement with them, and still 
consider them, in some sense, to be remaining within IEA. Here is why. 
According to them, one in principle could have exactly the same subjective 
experience as the Capgras patient and not (even should not) go on to form the delusion. In 
other words, the Capgras patient in principle could (and ought to) disregard what his 
experience is “telling him”, namely the evidence provided by experience, as one might, for 
example, with a well-known visual illusion (both Bayne and Pacherie 2004, and Pacherie 
                                                 
7 Thanks to an anonymous referee for making this point. 
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2009 explicitly cite the Muller-Lyer illusion in support of this). My proposal seeks to go 
beyond the endorsement theory by denying this possibility. First, the evidence that supports 
the claim that there are patients who have “the same experience”, but who don’t go on to form 
the delusion (Tranel, Damasio and Damasio 1995) is, as we shall see, not very convincing. 
For starters, “sameness of experience” is asserted on the grounds of diminished skin 
conductance response. But this physiological response can be interfered with in any number 
of ways and does not demonstrate “sameness of experience”. The second point is more 
philosophical in nature. On an attractive, but overlooked, view of judgment, experience and 
the relation between the two, the difference between judging and not judging is itself an 
experiential difference (see, e.g. Pitt 2004). The sense of trusting or not trusting your senses is 
an experiential (or phenomenological, if you prefer) difference (see Ratcliffe 2004 and 2008 
for an approach running along similar lines). . 
There is, therefore, even for the endorsement theorist, inference going on, namely, the 
weighing up of evidence from what the current perceptual experience is telling the subject, 
against the subject’s background beliefs (including the general implausibility that people can 
look exactly like others and yet somehow fail to be them). This means that endorsement 
theorists need to rely on a reasoning deficit to explain the tenacity of the delusion just as 
much as the explanationists. Indeed endorsement theorists (Bayne and Pacherie 2004) express 
this explicitly.  
 
 
3. Problems with IEA: Queries from the Armchair 
 
We have seen that several theories fall under IEA (one-factor, two-factor, explanationist and 
endorsement theories). What they all have in common is that the delusion is formed on the 
basis of an inference based on evidence in the subject’s experience. The subject recognizes 
that this person looks like A, and this would usually be evidence to support the judgment that 
this person is A, but there is an experiential anomaly that epistemically defeats this. 
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There are three problematic issues that I’d like to raise for IEA. The first two are non-
empirical: they constitute a logical issue and a related epistemological issue. The third, 
empirical issue, the “psychological” issue, is the most important and will constitute section 4.  
 
3.1 The Logical Issue 
Ordinary language allows that you can “recognize” an individual as well as a property or 
kind: you can “recognize” a rook, but you can also “recognize” your mother. Here superficial 
linguistic similarity is obscuring a deep logical difference. The former (“This [bird] is a 
rook”) is of the form Fa whereas the latter (“This [woman] is my mother”) is of the form a = 
b. Namely, one predicates a property of an individual (the referent of a singular term), 
whereas the other makes a connection of identity between two individuals (or rather 
implicitly claims that two singular terms have the same referent). This is why I prefer to use 
“identification” rather than “recognition” for judgments of the form a = b.  
This terminological distinction between identification and recognition is not arbitrary, 
but serves to mark what I take to be a deep difference in the epistemology and psychology of 
the tracking of qualitative similarity and the tracking of numerical identity, namely, the 
judgment that something looks a certain way and the judgment that something is a certain 
individual. The former attributes a property to an individual; the latter picks out an individual 
as a previously encountered individual, which is, in principle, independent of attributed 
properties.  
 
3.2 The Epistemological Issue 
Before making my central epistemological claim it is important to see precisely what IEA 
epistemologically amounts to. 
An analogy might be as follows. An ornithologist, who owns many acres of 
woodland, has a favorite rook, call it Bob. However, he often gets confused between Bob and 
the vast number of very similar looking rooks (although he can tell after a while from the 
rook’s behavior when he has got his initial identification wrong). To put an end to this 
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confusion, he puts a ring on Bob’s leg. Now when he sees a certain rook he might think, 
“This has the appearance of Bob (and therefore, so far, could be Bob)”. Upon closer 
inspection, the ring is absent; therefore the possibility of it being Bob is ruled out. For IEA, 
the affectively underpinned covert recognition (or lack thereof) is epistemically analogous to 
the ornithologist seeing this ring (or seeing its absence). Both are about a supplementary and 
identifying piece of evidence. 
 However, this supplementary evidence can be defeated, and, more specifically, 
undercut.8 If the ornithologist had reason to think that the ring had fallen off (e.g. he had 
found it on the ground), he would think twice about judging on the basis of the ring’s absence 
that the rook in question isn’t Bob.9  
This is analogous to the Capgras case according to IEA. And yet, if we look at actual 
cases, the patients do have reason to believe that that evidence would be missing: they are 
made aware by their doctor of their brain damage and its effects. However, unlike our 
ornithologist, Capgras patients do not refrain from judging on the basis of this lack of 
identifying information that the individual they encounter is not the individual in question. 
One way that IEA has of explaining this, as we saw, is by saying that the delusional subject 
doesn’t give the undercutting evidence as much weight as she ought to (and gives her 
experiential evidence too much weight). However, another way, which I am proposing in this 
paper, is to say that the delusional judgment is not formed on the basis of evidence, it is non-
inferential.  
Recognition, one might think, is needed to set up the possibility of identification, and 
hence misidentification. Someone’s not feeling like your father is not evidence that defeats 
the judgment that this man is your father if this man looks nothing like your father, and you 
were not tempted to judge that he was your father anyway. But identification should not 
                                                 
8 Following Pollock (1986) we can distinguish, within defeating evidence, between undercutting and 
rebutting evidence. Undercutting evidence defeats evidence e for p by putting the reliability of e in 
question. Rebutting evidence, on the other hand, defeats e by directly presenting stronger evidence for 
not-p.  
9 Conversely, if he had reason to think that a prankster had attached a similar ring on other identical 
looking rooks (e.g. if he saw two rooks with the same kind of ring), he would think twice about 
judging, on the basis of a rook’s having the ring, that it is Bob. 
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always be thought of like this. Intuitive as this may seem, we shall see in the next section, 
especially when we examine the Frégoli delusion, that identification demonstrably isn’t 
always parasitic on recognition in this way, but can operate entirely independently.  
The fact that it can operate independently, though perhaps counterintuitive (and at 
times making it hard, or impossible, to verbally justify judgments of identification), is no bad 
thing when we consider the central epistemic point I want to make, which is as follows. 
Judging that two things are the same individual (identification) and judging that two things 
look the same (recognition) are very different kinds of judgment. You can judge, and indeed 
be justified in judging, that x at t1 and y at t2 are the same individual, in spite of them looking 
nothing like each other. Indeed (and this is the way around that is relevant to the Capgras 
delusion) you can judge that x at t1 and y at t2 are distinct individuals in spite of looking the 
same. 
Some theorists, (e.g. Evans 1982) are sensitive to the idea that you might make 
identification judgments not on the basis of recognitional evidence, but on background 
knowledge, such as spatiotemporal location (i.e. you might be able to locate your old friend 
James, since you’ve been told that he’s working the morning shift at the sandwich shop, but 
you might also be warned that he has changed beyond all recognition). I want to take things 
even further. Sometimes identificational judgments are made on the basis of no evidence at 
all, not even spatiotemporal location. They are not the product of inference. These “intuitive” 
judgments can be based on a reliable mechanism. Sometimes this reliability breaks down, and 
you get misidentification (and if this breakdown is stable and persistent enough, you get 
delusional misidentification). This constitutes the psychological issue I have to raise against 
IEA. 
 
3.3. The Psychological Issue 
The Epistemological Issue was a necessary claim, stemming from the difference between the 
metaphysics of unique individuals and that of multiply instantiable appearances. In any 
possible world, for any intelligent subject, a judgment of identification is such that it can in 
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principle be correct (and reliable/justified/non-accidental) without any support from 
recognition.  
 The Psychological Issue is very different. It is a contingent claim about how we 
humans happen to make such judgments of identification. The whole of the next section is 
dedicated to this. 
 
 
4. On the Independence of Tracking Individuals (Identification)  
 
Here I will just state the claim plainly: human judgments about numerical identity can and do 
bypass judgments about qualitative similarity (and spatiotemporal trajectory) altogether. In 
such a situation the judgment of identification (which could, of course, be wrong, as in 
delusional cases) is not something that is inferred. In other words, it is not the product of 
personal-level inference, biased or otherwise. It is with this that I introduce and elucidate the 
notion of tracking individuals, namely, judgments of identification. 
 
4.1 Bypassing both Similarity of Appearance and Spatiotemporal Considerations 
I don’t want to deny that we often make judgments of identification on the basis of judgments 
about appearance, with the addition of some kind of abductive inference. For example, we say 
to ourselves, “This looks exactly like my tennis racket; it is unlikely that there should be a 
tennis racket that looks exactly like mine, and that isn’t mine; therefore it is mine”. And of 
course, there are also certain principles about spatiotemporal location. If the racket is where I 
left it, then that further supports my judgment. Or if I see it in one place, and then an 
identical-looking racket somewhere where it couldn’t possibly be, then I ought not to judge 
that this racket, on the second encounter, is mine. The error of IEA is to think that this 
generalizes across the board for all judgments of identification (including delusional 
misidentification). There are many routes that lead to judgments of identification. There are 
certainly different inferential routes, different kinds of evidence that can lead to a judgment of 
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identification (e.g. perceiving similarity or keeping spatiotemporal track of an individual). 
However, my empirical claim is that sometimes there are routes to identification that don’t 
make use of any personal level evidence, viz. that aren’t inferential at all. Sometimes, the 
judgment of numerical identity relies entirely on a non-inferential mechanism, which involves 
neither the matching of qualitative similarity nor the application of spatiotemporal 
principles.10  
Consider what happens when you encounter someone and you (implicitly) ask 
yourself “Have I met this person before?” In the vast majority of cases, there is no personal 
level inference. You don’t work out whether you’ve met them before. The question is just 
answered. 
This appeal to intuitions about everyday cases may not convince, so I turn to more 
robust support for the possibility of non-inferential judgments of identification. 
 
4.2 Support for Bypassing: Identification and Recognition come apart in Dreams and 
Delusions 
 
4.2.1 Dreams 
Schwartz and Maquet (2002) compared the content of dream reports with functional imaging 
during REM sleep (i.e. the sleep stage during which vivid dreams are reported) (see also J. 
Hobson 1999). The central idea is that, in principle, dream features can be mapped onto 
specific distributions of brain activity.11 This has generally been taken to show a distinction 
between “feature binding” (the construction of a perceptual or quasi-perceptual 
representation) and “contextual binding” (the organization of the representations into a 
                                                 
10 A rare example of where (purported) identification not only doesn’t use, but also actively flouts, 
spatiotemporal principles is in reduplicative paramnesia: the delusion that a place or individual is 
existing in two places at once. 
11 What is assumed by this approach is that the anatomical segregation of brain functions remains 
similar when one is dreaming to when one is awake. It has been shown that this assumption holds for 
audition: the presentation of auditory stimuli during REM sleep elicits responses that are similar to 
those elicited during wakefulness (so with no contrary evidence presenting itself the assumption is, not 
without justification, extrapolated across the board). 
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narrative or theoretical explanation) (see Gerrans 2012).12 Instead, I would here like to focus 
on what dreams tell us about the distinction between identification (tracking individuals, 
perceiving identity) and recognition (the perceiving of appearance or similarity). This 
distinction is located within feature binding, although it is clearly contentious whether and in 
what sense identity can enter into a perceptual or “quasi-perceptual” representation.  
 Dreaming uses similar resources to waking cognition, and depends on a large-scale 
neural network.13 As Schwartz and Maquet point out, the content of certain bizarre elements 
of dreams, as well as the underlying brain activity, may resemble the content and brain 
activity associated with the delusions of misidentification that we are concerned with here. I 
want to suggest that recognition and identification regularly come apart, not only in 
delusional cases, but also in the dreams of healthy subjects. Consider this dream report: “I had 
a talk with your colleague, but she looked differently, much younger, like someone I went to 
school with, perhaps a 13-year-old girl.” Or this one: “I recognize A’s sister […] I am 
surprised by her beard, she looks much more like a man than a woman, with a big nose”  
(both quoted in Schwartz and Maquet 2002, p. 26 and p. 29). This dissociation between how 
people look and who they are taken to be, coupled with imaging results, shows, as Schwartz 
and Maquet neatly put it,  
 
that neuronal processes during sleep can simultaneously and independently engage 
(1) unimodal visual areas underlying the internal generation of a perceptual 
representation of an individual’s face [i.e. “recognition”][…] and (2) distinct 
multimodal associative areas in the temporal lobe responsible for triggering the 
                                                 
12 Like me, Gerrans (2012) uses dreams to shed light on delusional misidentification. He however, uses 
them to show that delusions should still be thought of as responses to experiences (viz. to support “the 
standard account” against “the revisionist account”). Although not incompatible with what I say here, 
the emphasis is very different. For me the main point is to distinguish recognition and identification, to 
see that they are epistemically very different, and (and here is where dreams are illustrative) 
psychologically independent. 
13 However, during sleep there is highly diminished activity in the frontal lobe (which is normally 
taken to perform supervisory control functions). This is perhaps why dream experiences can be 
extremely strange, and yet go completely unquestioned by the dreamer. We will also see that frontal 
lobe lesions or atrophy may contribute to delusions. 
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retrieval of a familiar individual’s identity [i.e. “identification”]. (2002, p.26, 
emphasis added) 
 
Firstly, although simplistic, it is worth mentioning that the Capgras delusion is 
associated with damage to the right temporal lobe (see, e.g. Staton et al. 1982 and Johnson 
and Raye 1998), to which Schwartz and Maquet ascribe the role of “identity retrieval” (we 
will, in particular, see the relevance of this in section 5). Secondly, such a postulation of two 
distinct mechanisms for the tracking of numerical identity and qualitative similarity would 
suggest that, in principle, the two can come apart.14 In the Capgras delusion there is 
recognition without identification (someone looks like a certain person but is taken not to be 
that person) so there ought in principle to be cases where there is identification, or at least 
purported identification, without recognition.  
 
4.2.2. The Frégoli Delusion  
We have seen that this can happen in dreams (with bearded man-sisters), but it can also 
happen, like with Capgras, following brain damage. The Frégoli delusion (that a known 
individual is taking on the different guises of surrounding strangers) involves precisely this: 
purported identification without recognition. Like in dreams, people are (wrongly) identified 
without the slightest overt justification. Feinberg et al. (1999), for example, report a brain-
damaged patient, BJ, who : 
 
…approached a severely disabled, wheelchair-bound patient in his early twenties 
whom he had never met before, and claimed that the patient was his younger son. [...] 
He maintained this misidentification despite clear differences in physical appearance 
between the falsely identified patient and his son. Even when these distinctions were 
                                                 
14 There are two readings of “identification”: one is factive, so on this reading “identification” would 
mean successful identification. The other is non-factive, so identification could simply mean the 
activation of the identification mechanism, i.e. purported identification (which may or may not be 
correct). I use the factive reading and explicitly specify “purported” or “wrong”, when I am referring to 
misidentification. 
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pointed out by staff, BJ maintained his original assertion that the patient was his son. 
(1999, p.378)   
 
Both Capgras and Frégoli patients have no difficulty matching perceivable properties, 
namely, recognizing the appearance of thing. They just don’t identify the people they 
misidentify on the basis of this matching. In the terminology I have introduced, both involve 
disorders of identification, not of recognition. 
However, this raises the following question. If these patients were to base their 
judgments on appearances then they would get them right. The Capgras patient would judge 
that these people, who look just like her parents are her parents; the Frégoli patient would 
judge that this man who looks nothing like his younger son is not his younger son. So why 
aren’t we designed to base our judgments of identification on appearances all the time? To 
answer this, we must consider the utility of that very same identification mechanism that 
wreaks such havoc in pathological cases.  
 
4.3 Why the Bypassing? 
The properties of an object that can be perceived (usually visually, of course) don’t 
reliably singularize, as billiard balls, identical twins, or identical-looking animals abundantly 
demonstrate. In other words, you can be completely right about how something looks (or 
sounds), but very wrong about which individual it is. And this could be dangerous. Suppose I 
own two seemingly identical dogs, one is docile and the other is vicious: it is vitally important 
that I can somehow tell which is which. I may have developed the ability to do this, but am 
totally incapable of justifying (of having access to) how I do this. 
What is inherently relevant is not whether this person looks a certain way, but 
whether they are the same individual as the one you encountered at a previous juncture. This 
will let you predict their personality, how they will behave (so you will know whether you 
should be relaxed or on edge) and will let you know what they know and what experiences 
they have shared with you (with loved ones, this can be rather a lot). The way an individual 
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looks or sounds is only indirectly relevant insofar as it is often a pretty reliable indication of 
identity. Most people, if their spouse went missing, wouldn’t settle for someone who merely 
looked like (or even behaved like) their spouse. They would want their spouse: a certain 
individual with a certain past. 
However, it is prima facie puzzling that the “property” of being an individual cannot 
physically trigger a tracking mechanism. It is not because your mother is a certain individual 
that she impacts on your nervous system in the way in which she does. It is because of her 
physical (e.g. visible, tactile, auditory, behavioral) properties. If someone were to recreate a 
duplicate of your mother, who looked, sounded, smelled, behaved etc, just like your mother, 
this duplicate would impact on your nervous system in the same way, in spite of being a 
different individual with a very different history.15 You would, short of any evidence to the 
contrary, take this duplicate to be your mother. 
Nevertheless, one must not confuse the causally efficacious properties that the 
tracking mechanism exploits, with the property tracked, which in this case isn’t really a 
property, but an individual.16 When tracking identity, our cognitive systems exploit all sorts 
of information (voice, mannerisms, appearance, smell etc.). But it can do so very 
automatically. When this happens we will judge that this person is a certain someone (or 
someone we’ve met, or someone we haven’t met) without having consciously worked it out 
from her perceivable properties, and often without having post hoc access to why we have 
judged this.  
Since taking an individual to be in your presence is (to pick up on the turn of phrase 
that Schwartz and Maquet use) a “multimodal associative” phenomenon, the modality that 
triggers the identification (or misidentification) needn’t only be vision. It could be the 
                                                 
15 Indeed, this is another perplexing thing about the Capgras delusion. Some patients admit that the 
impostor looks just like the replaced loved one (others confabulate slight differences). Surely then the 
patient would expect to be fooled by the impostor’s perfect disguise! 
16 Unless you take “the property of being an individual” to be a property, but, as 3.1 aimed to show, 
this is merely a mirage set up by natural language. Indeed, both logically and metaphysically, 
properties and individuals (which are bearers of properties) are traditionally opposed.  
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dominant modality, or a modality that is sufficiently used to identify others.17 This view 
therefore has scope for explaining reported cases of the Capgras delusion in blind patients 
(see Dalgalarrondo, Fujisawa and Banzato (2002) for a brief review), where the 
misidentification occurs on the basis of audition. In contradistinction, fully sighted patient DS 
(Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997) doesn’t misidentify his father on the phone, but only 
visually (i.e. his dominant modality). Note also that the existence of one single blind Capgras 
patient is highly damaging to any theory that takes the delusion to necessarily arise from 
damage to neural pathways that are dedicated to the visual processing of facial information 
(e.g. Ellis and Young 1990).  
Hirstein and Ramachandran (1997) and Hirstein (2010), rightly emphasize the 
difference between the perceivable properties of an individual, and our representations of 
them “from the inside”. According to them, the Capgras delusion occurs when our “internal” 
representation of the person is damaged or inaccessible. This produces the impression of 
someone who looks right on the outside, but seems different on the inside (that is why 
Hirstein 2010 claims that these misidentification syndromes are mindreading disorders). It is 
illustrative to see how this differs from my view. On their view, we represent (Hirstein 2010 
often refers to his view as “the representational hypothesis”) two different kinds of properties 
of a person: their appearance, and what they are like “as a person.” However, although this 
may well be true, for understanding delusional misidentification, I don’t want to emphasize 
the difference between two different kinds of properties (or representations). I want to 
emphasize the difference between two tasks, namely, recognizing properties and tracking 
individuals. The latter is independent of any property, even the “internal” ones. I can, in 
principle, see someone as my mother, even though both her appearance and her personality 
have changed beyond all recognition. Tracking is just a logically, epistemically and 
psychologically different task. Hirstein’s view also struggles to account for the delusional 
                                                 
17 And indeed we needn’t take “presence” too literally either. Consider what underpins your taking 
yourself to be talking to your mother on the phone. Or it may not even involve recognizing something 
uniquely produced by her, like the sound of her voice. Consider the warm feeling you get from 
receiving a text message from a loved one. 
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misidentification of inanimate objects (e.g. Alexander et al. 1979) (and there have been 
reports of Capgras-style misidentification for animals and places too). This seems to illustrate 
just the kind of distinction I’m getting at. These patients will say things like, “that’s not my 
set of keys: it looks just like it, but it isn’t it”. They fail to re-identify (to track) previously 
encountered objects, just as Capgras patients fail to re-identify previously encountered 
people. 
Let’s recap. We have characterized IEA. We have looked at three problematic issues 
for IEA. Two are philosophical. One concerns logical differences between judgments of 
identification and recognition. The other concerns the epistemology of these judgments, 
namely, the sorts of things that can support them. Then there was an empirical issue, 
concerning, (i) the independence of the mechanisms underpinning these tasks and (ii) the non-
inferential (i.e. non evidence-based) nature of some judgments of identification. Now I’d like 
to ask: what does this judgment actually amount to? 
 
 
5 Introducing Identity Files 
 
In order for a subject to identify an individual, the individual in question needs to have at least 
some salience for the subject as an individual (rather than, say, as a kind or a bearer of certain 
properties). Think of people who are not salient in the relevant sense, that you encounter 
once, casually and in passing. These people you might qualitatively categorize on the fly in 
terms of kinds and properties (girl, red hair etc.). But if I asked you to identify such a person, 
if I asked you “Who is this person?” you would rightly protest that the question makes no 
sense. Answering that question requires one to make the connection between the encountered 
person and somebody one has encountered previously, whether in person, on television, in the 
newspapers etc. When I ask you to identify someone who has no salience for you qua 
individual, I am asking you to perform an impossible task: I am asking you to make a 
connection between this person (under a perceptual, or perhaps short-term recollective, mode 
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of presentation) and a person at a previous encounter, but where there is no such previous 
encounter. On the other hand, walking past someone who looks like, say, John Cleese, it 
makes perfect sense for me to ask, “Is that John Cleese?” I’m asking, “Is the man we just 
walked past the very same man we are so familiar with from Monty Python?” Now what does 
this connection involve?     
Some philosophers of language, when theorizing about reference to individuals use 
the somewhat metaphorical notion of a “mental file”.18 Mental files are created for individuals 
(upon first encounter) and retrieved (upon subsequent encounters) and are filled with 
information (viz. properties, predicates) which is taken to apply to the individual in question, 
but it is the file, or rather the acquaintance relation (which can be perceptual or through 
various informational chains, such as the media) on which the opening of the file was 
grounded, which fixes the reference.19 The point is that a mental file can be virtually empty, 
or filled with largely inaccurate information, and still achieve reference.  
Suppose I meet someone, John (call him John-1), and I am subsequently told 
information that I wrongly take to pertain to him (e.g. that he has climbed Everest), by 
somebody who unwittingly thinks that I met a different John (John-2). No amount of false 
information, even though that information accurately pertains to John-2, will mean that my 
beliefs (and other thoughts) cease to refer to John-1 and start referring to John-2. My belief 
about a given individual, that he has climbed Everest, is obviously a false belief about John-1, 
not a true belief about John-2. Namely, to whom I refer is determined by who I actually 
encountered and not who happens to fit the description I take to apply to an individual.20 
The content of a file for an individual constitutes our conception of that individual. 
This conception will involve a variety of different kinds of information that is taken to pertain 
                                                 
18 Strawson (1959), Evans (1982), Bach (1994), Perry (2001), Recanati (1993) all use something like 
mental files. 
19 The mental files theory can be seen as an elaboration of direct or causal theories of reference (as 
opposed to descriptive or satisfactional theories). It is not what happens have certain properties that fit 
a description, that is the referent of a singular term, but rather a particular individual that bears a certain 
causal relation to the use of the term. 
20 Mental files resemble the PINs (Personal Identity Nodes) postulated in several models of face 
recognition. But I do not intend them to be entities in cognitive modelling; rather they are abstract, 
philosophical entities that function at the level of thought. 
 23 
to that individual; what they have done, when you have encountered them in the past, 
character traits etc., as well as what they look like. This conception, we have seen, can be 
false in many ways, and yet still be about that individual, since it is the initial encounter that 
caused the opening of the file that determines the referent. The conception, the contents of the 
file, can also be updated. Suppose my school friend, Jez, unbeknownst to me, went on to 
become a bank robber, underwent radical plastic surgery and fled to Australia. If I think to 
myself, “I wonder what happened to Jez?” I am thinking about that individual who is now in 
Australia with a radically different appearance (but, because I don’t know this, I am not 
thinking about him under that mode of presentation). When I discover this information from a 
friend, I update my file for him. Rather, what it is to discover this just is to update my 
conception of him. If I go and see him in person and recognize his voice or his eyes or his 
manner, I update my conception of him in a more fine-grained and perceptual way. I 
momentarily open a file for “this man here present” but that gets very swiftly merged with the 
file for “My old friend Jez”. The perceptual information I then get goes into that file and 
updates it. But in order for this to happen, the file needs to be correctly retrieved.  
Put generally, judging that someone in your presence is a salient previously 
encountered individual involves the triggered retrieval of the correct file; correct in the sense 
that it is in fact the file that you had initially opened or created for that very individual. And it 
will be incorrect if you retrieve a file that wasn’t opened for that individual (or fail to retrieve 
the file and erroneously open a new one) and that will be misidentification. The file contains 
all kinds of information and physical appearance is, firstly, only one kind of property among 
many, and secondly it is neither an essential nor a singularizing property (viz. A can change 
her properties, and others can look just like A). This means that a file can be retrieved in spite 
of the person looking superficially very unlike the person for whom the file was opened. All 
that needs to happen is that this person is seen as someone previously encountered, either on 
the basis of perceptual evidence (either voice, appearance, mannerisms), or indirect evidence 
(spatiotemporal trajectory) or, as suggested by our reflections on dreams and the Frégoli 
delusion, on the basis of a non-inferential, sub-personal tracking mechanism. The file can 
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also, as in the Capgras case, fail to be retrieved even though the person in question does look 
like the person for whom the file was opened. On this view, the delusional misidentification 
in the Capgras case consists in an inability to associate the loved one, and with this, her 
biography, with the person now present (who is de facto the loved one). This is made nicely 
explicit in Lucchelli and Spinnler (2007, p.189), who tell of the case of Fred and Wilma (both 
fictional names, of course). When Fred denies that Wilma is his wife, he cites that he “knew 
[her] very well as his sons’ mother.” Obviously, “mother of my sons” is not a perceivable 
property, but it is in the “Wilma file”, which is failing to be correctly retrieved, and which he 
cannot associate with the woman here present. 
Whereas the Capgras delusion illustrates a failure to retrieve a file (and, one might 
say, the erroneous opening of a new file) in the presence of someone who looks like the 
person for whom the file was opened (because they are that person!), the Frégoli delusion 
involves the erroneous retrieval of a file upon contact with someone whose appearance is – 
and, strikingly, is recognized by the subject to be – nothing like the person for whom the file 
was opened. It is worth noting that IEA, although prima facie plausible for the Capgras 
delusion, is less plausible for the Frégoli delusion. Presumably, since it appeals to diminished 
affect in the presence of loved ones to explain Capgras, IEA would need to appeal to 
heightened affect in the presence of strangers to explain Frégoli. But why should heightened 
affect lead to the judgment that one is in the presence of a specific person (as is the case in 
Frégoli delusion)? One would instead expect a certain “haven’t I met you before?” response 
(a response we are all familiar with). On the file-retrieval model, the patient judges that it is 
that specific person because their cognitive system has retrieved or activated the file for that 
person.   
 
 
6. Consequences of the Non-inferential File Retrieval View  
 
 25 
What does the view that the delusional misidentification is non-inferential rule out? As I said, 
when I claim that delusional misidentification is non-inferential, I mean personal-level 
inference; the sort of inference that a person, and not a part of the person, does. To avoid a 
merely terminological dispute, let me outline what I take to be the concrete consequences of 
this view, and how it differs from existing views. 
(i) Since the delusion isn’t an inference on the basis of experiential evidence, it makes 
no sense to speak of subjects who have “the same experience” but who don’t go on to 
form the delusion (Recall that this is where I part company with Bayne and Pacherie 
2004, and Pacherie 2009). 
(ii) These delusional patients will, at least potentially, perform normally in personal-
level reasoning tasks. Personal-level reasoning biases aren’t needed to explain the 
presence of the delusion. 
(iii) The delusion will be something that the patient will be certain of when the 
perceived impostor/stranger is present. The subject will have no actual grounds for 
their belief, but may confabulate some post hoc, e.g. minor changes in appearance. As 
Hirstein 2010 points out, these are treated “as confirmatory of a preexisting belief” 
(p.246). 
 
6.1 File retrieval versus Two-factor IEA  
IEA claims that the patient adopts a delusional hypothesis on the evidential basis of an 
affectively anomalous experience. We have seen that such views, as they stand, plausibly fail 
(pace Maher) to account for the tenacity of the delusion. On the explanationist models, since 
delusions involve an inference to the best explanation of the anomalous experience, one 
would expect the delusional hypothesis pretty swiftly to cease to be the best explanation (viz. 
a rational person ought to abandon such a hypothesis). Similarly, on the endorsement model, 
one would expect the patient to reject what his visual experience is telling him. For example, 
on either explanationist or endorsement models, one would expect the following assurance on 
the part of the doctor to provide defeating evidence and hence cure the Capgras patient: “The 
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reason why you believe that this person isn’t your mother is because you have had an accident 
that has damaged your brain and will make her feel unfamiliar/seem to you like she isn’t your 
mother.”21 But it doesn’t. As we saw, this has led the majority of IEA theorists to postulate a 
“second factor” in the form of a reasoning deficit.  
There is a lot of truth behind the two-factor theories, in particular the claim that 
organic delusions are associated with two loci of damage (one temporal and one frontal). 
Suppose you had a Capgras patient, with the frontal and temporal damage, and you had 
another patient with the same temporal damage, but not the frontal damage. I am not claiming 
that the latter patient would have the Capgras delusion. I am not denying that frontal damage 
is necessary for the delusion. For this reason I am not unsympathetic to two-factor theories 
per se, but only to those that seem to imply IEA, or take it for granted. I will call such views 
“two-factor IEA”. I oppose what two-factor IEA suggests, which is that the temporal damage 
should be thought of as determining the experiential evidence (factor 1), and the frontal 
damage as providing a reasoning deficit that operates upon that evidence (factor 2). 
Proponents of two-factor IEA (e.g. Stone and Young 1997, Davies et al. 2001) tend to 
take two things to support their view. The first is that there are patients who appear to have a 
lack of affective response to familiar faces, hence that are prima facie similar to Capgras 
patients, but who do not go on to form the delusion (Tranel, Damasio and Damasio 1995). 
What is hypothesized is that these patients have the first factor (“the same experience”), but 
lack the second-factor reasoning deficit. In spite of this, these cases fail to offer good support, 
because, as I mentioned earlier, this sameness of experience is postulated on the basis of 
diminished SCR, which falls very short of being conclusive evidence for sameness of 
experience. Relatedly, their lesions are very different from those in Capgras (which tend to be 
associated with a combination of right lateral temporal lesions and dorsolateral prefrontal 
damage). These cases have ventromedial prefrontal damage, which is absent in Capgras 
                                                 
21 As mentioned, this would be undercutting, rather than rebutting evidence.  
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patients.22 In related fashion, such patients, although not delusional, are in many respects 
more globally disabled than Capgras patients. Unlike Capgras patients, they treat loved ones 
and strangers identically, and have severely deficient decision-making capabilities.  
A second kind of support is more direct in claiming that delusional patients 
demonstrably exhibit reasoning biases. However, the cited experiments (Garety 1991, Huq et 
al. 1988, John and Dodgson 1994) all involve schizophrenia rather than brain-damaged 
patients. In patients with such a global psychiatric pathology as schizophrenia, one would 
expect general reasoning biases. As far as I know, there is no evidence that such deficits exist 
in Capgras cases that occur in the context of brain damage only.23  Brain-damaged Capgras 
patients (i.e. ones that don’t have schizophrenia) appear to be surprisingly reasonable and 
levelheaded. You can see it for yourself in interviews with them. That is part of what is so 
striking about the delusion.  
 On my proposal, since the identity file is retrieved (or fails to be retrieved) as the 
result of a non-inferential mechanism, the delusion is not the product of any personal level 
inference, biased or otherwise. This certainly fits with the accounts of Capgras patients. Every 
time they lay their eyes of their loved one, they cannot help judging that the perceived person 
is not the loved one in question. Now what the two-factor theorist may then be right about is 
that frontal damage (in particular to DLPFC) causes some kind of reality-testing deficit. This 
would play a role in explaining why the delusional belief, once non-inferentially formed, is 
not rejected. It is illuminating (see also footnote 15) to note that DLPFC is hypoactive during 
dreams, which may explain why we are so uncritical of our dream experiences. But, like I 
have suggested, this uncritical response can itself be conceived as part of the experience. 
                                                 
22 One might, for example, hypothesize that although these patients have no difficulty making the 
correct identification, they lack the ability to associate the appropriate emotional salience to the 
episodic information that is telling them that they are in the presence of a loved one. 
23 Granted, McKay and Cipolotti (2007) document a case of an internalising attributional style in 
purely organic cases of Cotard delusion. This supports Young and Leafhead’s (1996) hypothesis that 
Capgras and Cotard delusions may have the same ‘first factor’ (viz. an affective disruption) but a 
different second factor (viz. attributional style). Whereas Capgras involves an externalising 
attributional style (“she feels affectively flat because she’s not my mother”), Cotard involves an 
internalizing attributional style (“she feels affectively flat because I am dead”). As the vocabulary 
suggests, these are not biases in the sense of being misuses of evidence. Rather they are attributional 
styles, default (possibly mood-based) stances on the world. 
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6.2 Misidentification of Loved Ones Only? 
It has often been noted that IEA has the attraction of explaining why Capgras patients only 
misidentify loved ones. Namely, the patient sees someone who looks like a loved one and 
expects that person to feel like a loved one (or to provoke an appropriate affective response). 
It is this frustrated expectation, this mismatch, that drives the delusional inference. This 
expectation is not present in the case of those who are not loved ones, and hence they are not 
misidentified.  How does the file retrieval view account for this pattern?  
 The first thing to note is that many Capgras patients go on to misidentify far more than 
their loved ones. Ellis et al. (1997) mention a patient who was under the impression that 
almost everybody in a town had been replaced. Furthermore, IEA, as it stands, struggles to 
explain the cases where the duplicates themselves are duplicated (i.e. the impostors are 
replaced, as in the original case described by Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux (1923)). This 
cannot be the result of expected emotional response, since the subjects would not expect 
warmth from the impostor (indeed it is this lack of warmth that makes them judge it to be an 
impostor in the first place). In spite of these problems for IEA, the file retrieval view still 
needs to explain the fact that some patients seem to only misidentify their loved ones. 
IEA cannot explain Frégoli delusion, and among Capgras cases can only explain ones 
where loved ones are misidentified, and only misidentified once. Thinking of delusional 
misidentification in terms of files and tracking mechanisms gives us the tools to explain a 
wider variety of cases. Patients who misidentify differing classes of people (e.g. only loved 
ones or all acquaintances) in either stable or reduplicative ways (the doubles are stable or 
reduplicated) will be understood in terms of differing damage to the mechanisms 
underpinning formation and retrieval of files. Thus the “classic” Capgras patient, who 
misidentifies one or two loved ones, and does so in a non-reduplicative way, can be 
understood as having difficulty in retrieving the file for, e.g., “dad”, and therefore cannot 
judge that the person they encounter is that person, although the new “double” file stabilizes 
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and is retrieved whenever the father is seen (DS himself says, “He’s a nice guy, doctor, but 
he’s not my father” (Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997, p.438)). The patient who misidentifies 
a wider class of people, also in a non-reduplicative way, can be understood as having 
difficulties with the retrieval of more files, or perhaps with all previously created files. 
Reduplicative delusional misidentification, e.g. where even “the other dad” is judged to have 
been replaced, may be seen as a problem either with retrieving both old and newly created 
files, or with a deficit in the creation of stable files that can be retrieved. This is obviously 
speculative and needs to be fleshed out, but it shows that the framework is flexible enough to 
accommodate the existing cases. 
Another case, that fits none of these profiles just mentioned, is another problematic 
case for IEA. Although patient DS (Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997), misidentifies his 
parents and correctly identifies mere acquaintances, he occasionally duplicates newly 
encountered people. This is  problematic for IEA since, how could the expectation of positive 
affect drive the required inference, since, presumably, with new people there wouldn’t be 
one?  
The file retrieval view, on the other hand, can explain this. When DS meets someone 
for the first time, a file is created in the normal way for them and this gets filled with any 
associated information. But if this person leaves the room for 30 minutes and returns, instead 
of the old file being retrieved and added to, an entirely new file is created: DS behaves as 
though he is meeting somebody new. This is not the lack of recognition that you get with 
amnesiacs. On the contrary, he’ll have no difficulty remembering that he met someone, and 
he’ll remember what she looked like. He’ll, for example, say: “I’ve just met your twin, and 
she was dressed just like you.” But it seems that the timing has to be right for this unusual 
duplication to occur. Again, this is speculative, but we might postulate the following.  
When you meet someone briefly and for the first time, your brain has a fast-learning 
mechanism that creates a very “thin” file (viz. one that contains very little information) and 
which enables you to re-identify that person. In DS’s case, due to his brain damage, the file is 
either not created with sufficient stability, or is not retrieved: the result, either way, is that a 
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new file is erroneously created (he takes himself to be meeting this person for the first time). 
However, given enough time with that person, the file will become “thicker”, and as a result 
will be more stable and/or easier to retrieve. In addition to this, however, there has been 
damage to his ability to retrieve the, extremely “thick”, file for his parents. That is why, 
although DS duplicates both new people and his parents, he doesn’t duplicate the intermediate 
category, i.e. when he sees people a) who are not newly encountered but b) who are not loved 
ones. And that is also why he doesn’t duplicate, over and over again (i.e. the doubles 
themselves have doubles), everyone that he has met since his accident.24 To illustrate, he 
doesn’t duplicate those he has seen repeatedly or for a longer period of time, such as his 
neuropsychologist, whereas he might sometimes duplicate a cleaner or a nurse. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Let’s take stock. We have characterized IEA, noted epistemological differences 
between judgments of identification and judgments of recognition. We have noted that a non-
inferential route to identification, one that bypasses recognition (and spatiotemporal 
considerations), would be useful to any subject presented with the task of tracking 
individuals. We have seen from intuitions about meeting strangers, and from evidence from 
dreams and the Frégoli delusion, that such a route would not only be useful but actually 
seems to exist and be put to use in human cognition.  
I would like to end by considering some general lessons from this. One lesson may be 
that we need to be careful by what we mean by inference. In particular, we need to distinguish 
the personal-level inferences that persons do, and that epistemology tends to deal with, and 
the “inferences” that a part of your brain does. In this latter sense, delusional misidentification 
is an “inferential” process. But it is not the person who is performing the inference, on the 
                                                 
24 Interestingly, the first reported Capgras patient, Mme M. (Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux 1923) 
duplicated people over and over (i.e. the doubles themselves have doubles) – her husband as much as 
eighty times! 
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basis of an experience. In particular, it is unwarranted to make claims about patients (viz. 
VMPFC patients) having the “same experience” and not going on to form the delusion. As we 
saw, these claims are based on skin conductance response, which, physiologically, can be 
interfered with at various different places (indeed that these patients have different brain 
damage seems to support this) and, phenomenologically, tells us very little about the 
qualitative character of the experience. 
Another lesson is methodological. Philosophical reflection can help us understand the 
nature of the judgment or task at hand. Here, for example, we see that judgments of identity 
(identification) are extremely different from judgments of predication (recognition). One 
would therefore expect the psychological routes to these judgments to be different. 
Furthermore, it is worth considering that, given that delusions involve tenacious belief that is 
not in keeping with the beliefs of others, one would expect the physiological disruption of a 
useful, automatic tracking mechanism that we all take for granted to be a pretty good source 
of delusional phenomena (although of course there are others). It also nicely accounts for, and 
provides a parsimonious tool for describing, the Capgras and Frégoli delusions. The former 
involves recognition without identification, whereas the latter involves (purported) 
identification without recognition.    
Undoubtedly, more needs to be said about the mechanisms underpinning all this. My 
hope is that I have shown the starting point for an alternative to IEA that deserves serious 
consideration.  
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